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Abstract 
Compared to cryptography, steganography is a less discussed domain. However, there is a 
recent trend of exploiting various information hiding techniques to empower malware, for 
instance to bypass security frameworks of mobile devices or to exfiltrate sensitive data. This 
is mostly due to the need to counteract increasingly sophisticated security mechanisms, such 
as code analysis, runtime countermeasures, or real-time traffic inspection tools. In this 
perspective, this paper presents malware exploiting information hiding in a broad sense, i.e., it 
does not focus on classical covert channels, but also discusses other camouflage techniques. 
Differently from other works, this paper solely focuses on real-world threats observed in the 
2011 – 2017 timeframe. The observation indicates a growing number of malware equipped 
with some form of data hiding capabilities and a lack of effective and universal 
countermeasures.  
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1. Introduction 
The use of information hiding techniques, often generically referred to as steganography, to 
commit cyber-attacks or crimes has received relatively little attention in the academic 
literature or the media. When mentioned, steganography is typically discussed only in the 
context of covert communication between extremist individuals or groups [1]. Even then, 
some argue that there is little or no evidence that steganography is in use. While large-scale 
surveys found no conclusive traces of the use of data hiding, some authors warn against 
concluding that it is not in use [2]. Only recently there have been some signs that things are 
starting to change. Reports from McAfee [3] and Kaspersky [4] recognized the role that 
information hiding has in current malicious software and that it is highly likely to gain 
additional importance in the future. Furthermore, because of the sensitivity of the subject in 
many cases organizations are reluctant to report the detected use of steganography to the 
public [5].  
 
Historically, cryptography has been a more widely discussed topic, especially for law 
enforcement purposes. While in the past the mere existence of encrypted communications 
and data may have raised suspicions, today it is a frequent scenario. For example, malware 
using encrypted communications for Command and Control (C&C) purposes might previously 
have stood out from regular network traffic, but now it is effectively hidden within the 
“background noise” of routinely encrypted data exchanged in the network. Nevertheless, 
encrypted communications can be detected relatively easily and ancillary techniques, such as 
traffic analysis or metadata recovery, enable at least some intelligence to be derived from 
encrypted data and communications. Besides, the recovered metadata, e.g., who is 
communicating with whom, when and for how long, can be as important as, or even more 
important, than knowing the actual content.  
 
Currently, encryption is receiving greater attention from security professionals, law 
enforcement, security and intelligence agencies. For example, recent advancements in 
understanding how malicious software encrypts its own communications could help identify 
and block C&C communications of botnets [6]. Unfortunately, criminals or extremists are well 
aware of the increased focus on encryption and are looking for other ways to make malicious 
software stay “under the radar”, especially in the context of stealing data where triggering 
some form of defense must be avoided. In this vein, the most important and recent trend is to 
equip malware with information hiding capabilities, i.e., techniques that hide communications 
[7].  
 
This paper provides an overview of information hiding techniques that can be utilized by 
malware. By using real-world examples, this paper showcases existing and emerging threats 
using different types of data hiding mechanisms, i.e., not only limited to those adopting 
classical covert channels. The research presented here has been performed within the 
Criminal Use of Information Hiding (CUIng) initiative (cuing.org) that has been formed with 
the cooperation of the Europol European Cyber Crime Centre (EC3) for gathering experts 
from different backgrounds with the aim of monitoring information-hiding-capable threats 
and propose efficient countermeasures. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the general concepts 
of data hiding and covert channels. Section 3 analyzes existing malware using information 
hiding, while Section 4 discusses the road ahead from the perspective of the new challenges 
arising from the future use of information hiding in malware. Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Covert Channels and Data Hiding 
In this section, we introduce the fundamentals of generally perceived information hiding and 
its sub-disciplines, and how they are related to malware and the different phases of cyber-
attacks. Such attacks are commonly divided into five phases [8]: (1) reconnaissance 
(gathering of information), (2) scanning the target, (3) gaining access to the target, (4) 
maintaining the access and (5) covering the tracks. However, it must be noted that 
information hiding techniques are mostly applied in phases 2-4 on which we focus here. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Classification of hiding techniques and how they are used by malware in the different attack 
phases 
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As depicted in Fig. 1 information hiding is a very broad term. It encompasses different “sub-
disciplines” (or “domains”), which can be used by an attacker during different attack stages 
depending on what is subjected to hiding:  
 
 Identities: the identities of communicating parties are hidden by anonymization 
techniques. 
 Communication: the fact that a communication is taking place is hidden by 
steganography techniques. The very characteristics of a network conversation (e.g., a 
packet flow) can be concealed using traffic type obfuscation methods.  
 Content: hiding solely the content of data but not the transmission or presence of the 
data itself is achieved by applying cryptographic algorithms.  
 Code: the structure of (executable) code is hidden by (binary) code obfuscation and 
masquerading techniques. 
 
First, let us discuss the most important (from this paper’s perspective) data hiding methods 
which conceal the fact that a communication is taking place. Typically this type of information 
hiding is realized using some form of steganography.  
 
Historically, the earliest computer steganographic methods were focused on different media 
types, especially digital images. As an example, several algorithms hide information within the 
least significant bits of color definitions of pixels within an image as the human eye cannot 
spot such alterations. A similar approach has been used for audio and video. The natural 
evolution is to hide data in network transmissions, such as in inter-arrival times of packets or 
in unused fields of protocol headers. Network traffic provides the advantage of a continuous 
data flow, which a digital media file of constant size cannot provide. When secret data is 
hidden in network traffic, the secret communication channel is referred to as a network covert 
channel. 
 
In essence, network covert channels enable secret malware communications over any type of 
computer network, be it a local area network or the Internet. Compared to encryption, which 
only ensures the confidentiality of what a malware communicates, covert channels can help to 
keep the communication secret, e.g. to retain access to a hacked system. Moreover, control 
protocols can be used on top of covert channels, representing a form of C&C channel. Such 
control protocols allow to upload a newer version of a malware binary, to select a different 
encryption or covert signing scheme, to switch from one steganographic method to another or 
to apply dynamic overlay routing to bypass firewalls [9]. Malware can also apply network 
covert channels to conceal the exfiltration of organizational data over the network and to 
bypass firewalls by hiding data in transmissions that are not affected by its filtering policy. 
These goals affect especially attack phases 2 and 3 of Fig .1 (gaining and maintaining access). 
We point out that when referring to malware trying to communicate covertly or abusing some 
network service, the hacking community often uses the term tunneling. However, this is not 
accurate as tunneling hides traffic as a “by product”, and actually refers to the encapsulation 
of network data of the same or higher layer, e.g., IPv4 as payload in an IPv6 packet.  
 
While steganography aims to hide data inside of digital objects, two other classes of methods 
obfuscate information in code (code obfuscation) or network traffic (traffic type obfuscation). 
Obfuscation is different from steganography as the latter tries to communicate secret data in a 
non-noticeable manner while the former is directly visible to an analyst. Despite of their 
different strategies, both domains share the goal of hiding data. The goals of traffic type and 
code obfuscation affect phase 1 (scanning) but mainly phases 2 and 3 of Fig.1 (gaining and 
maintaining access).  
Anonymization provides means of communication without revealing private attributes of the 
communicating peers, such as their names, their IP addresses or geographical locations. In 
contrast to steganography, anonymization relies upon different techniques, such as spoofing 
of the IP address of a sender or cryptographic algorithms to fake or hide sensitive data that 
can be used to deduce information about who is involved in a communication. Note that, as 
shown in Fig. 1, cryptographic methods can be used to encrypt any kind of secret data, not just 
data that reveals identities. Thus, the application of cryptography is not limited to anonymity 
techniques. Anonymity techniques can be utilized during phases 1 (scanning) and 3 
(maintaining access) while encryption (despite of its use for anonymity purposes) affects 
phases 2-3 (gaining and maintaining access).  
 
3. Information Hiding Malware in to the Wild 
In this section we present several examples of information hiding-capable malware observed 
in to the wild owing to the CUIng initiative. Due to space constraints, we focus only on the 
most representative threats observed in the 2011-2017 period.  
 
Originally, information hiding techniques were implemented only in Advanced Persistent 
Threats (APTs) like Duqu, Regin or Hammertoss, which are the most sophisticated types of 
malware probably created with the support of nation-wide sponsors. However, as they 
proved their effectiveness, they are slowly becoming the de-facto standard also for the 
“ordinary” malware. As a demonstration, various types of currently popular threats like 
ransomware (e.g., TeslaCrypt, Cerber and SyncCrypt) or exploit-kits (Stego/Astrum, 
DNSChanger, and Sundown) use some form information hiding. This trend is reviewed in 
detail below.  
 
3.1 Malware using modifications to digital media files 
Currently, one of the most common ways for hiding data is to use digital media files as the 
secret carrier. The most common technique exploits digital images to: i) conceal malware 
settings or a configuration file; ii) provide the malware an URL from which additional 
components can be downloaded from; iii) store directly the whole malicious code. The most 
notable examples, in 2015, Vawtrak/Neverquest malware started utilizing steganography to 
hide settings in favicons, i.e., innocent-looking pictures widely available in websites. The 
malware extracts the least significant bits from each image’s pixel in order to reconstruct a 
previously embedded URL for downloading its configuration file. A similar approach has been 
used by Zbot malware, which downloaded an innocently-looking JPEG image on the infected 
system containing its configuration data appended at the end of the image. Finally, Lurk and 
Stegoloader used the least significant bit of a digital image (a BMP and PNG, respectively) to 
retrieve an encrypted URL for downloading additional software components.  
 
More recently, we also observed the use of information hiding techniques for malvertising 
attacks as evidenced by the AdGholas malware. AdGholas avoids detection by using 
steganography for hiding encrypted JavaScript code in images, text and HTML code. Lastly, at 
the end of 2016 large-scale attacks related to the online e-commerce platform Magento 
revealed the usage of image steganography to conceal details of payment cards. Specifically, 
once the platform was infected, the malware collected payment details and hid them inside 
images of real products available on the infected e-commerce site. By downloading such 
modified images, the attacker could easily exfiltrate the stolen data. 
 
3.2 Malware posing as other legitimate applications or mimicking their traffic behavior 
In this case, the malware relies on the mimicry of legitimate programs and/or their 
communications. A paradigmatic example is a variant of Android/Twitoor.A, a malware 
spreading by SMS or via malicious URLs. The malware impersonates a porn player app or an 
MMS application but without having their functionality, eventually tricking the user to install 
them and spread the infection. Another application, Irongate is the first notable example 
designed to operate in industrial control systems scenarios. One of the most important 
features is its ability to record several seconds of ordinary, legitimate traffic from a 
programmable logic controller and then use it as a smokescreen (i.e. the malicious commands 
are masked using legitimate ones) when sending intentionally modified data back. Such 
operation allowed the attacker to alter a controlled process without raising any security 
alerts.  
 
Another example is Fakem RAT that made its C&C traffic look like MSN and Yahoo! Messenger 
or HTTP conversations. At the beginning of 2017 Carbanak/Anunak demonstrated its ability 
in abusing Google cloud-based services to set-up a covert channel for C&C purposes. In this 
case, a unique Google Sheets spreadsheet is dynamically created in order to manage each 
infected victim. The use of a Google service granted attackers the ability to stay under the 
radar as typically such third party services are not blocked in the enterprise network and 
considered safe. Another example using a similar technique includes a new version of the 
SpyNote Trojan, which was disguised as a legitimate Netflix application. Once installed, it 
allowed the attacker to execute different actions, such as copy a user’s files, view a user’s 
contacts, and eavesdrop a user’s communication. More recently, a technique called domain 
fronting is gaining a lot of attention especially among APT-related groups. Put briefly, it is 
used to mask the true destination of a connection by mimicking legitimate traffic to an 
innocent destination. A successful implementation exploits HTTPS traffic to communicate 
with an infected host and making the traffic look like a Google search. Instead the traffic is 
produced by a connection exchanging data with the attacker.   
 
3.3 Information hiding in ransomware 
First experiments of this kind were discovered at the beginning of 2016 when TeslaCrypt has 
been spread using the Neutrino exploit kit. The infection process is as follows. Neutrino 
initially redirects users to a malicious landing page crafted for discovering the vulnerabilities 
of the victim to deliver the most appropriate exploit. If the vulnerability is successfully 
exploited, a downloader is executed. To gather data, it contacts a server, which responds with 
an HTTP 404 error page embedding C&C commands in the HTML comments tag. Next, in mid-
2016, Cerber has been identified as one of the macro-type malware-delivered ransomware 
across a variety of cloud-based file-sharing applications. To spread the infection, Cerber uses a 
decoy document which, when opened, loads a malicious macro-code that downloaded a JPEG 
file to the targeted machine. Inside this benign-looking image was the steganographically 
embedded malicious executable. Finally, in August 2017 a similar technique has been 
discovered in the SyncCrypt ransomware. Infected emails contained WSF (Windows Script 
File) attachments posing as court orders. If opened, a malicious code downloaded a digital 
image containing the core components of SyncCrypt.  
 
3.4 Information hiding in exploit kits 
This is one of the most recent trends. In this case, information hiding methods became so 
popular among cybercriminals that they are incorporated within exploit kits to allow 
developers with little or no programming skills to create, customize and distribute malware. 
The first example showing this feature is the Stegano/Astrum exploit kit, which has been used 
at the end of 2016 as part of a huge malvertising campaign. Its developers were able to embed 
malicious code within banner ads by modifying the color space of the used PNG image (i.e., the 
alpha channel). Then, the browsers of users viewing an infected ad parse an injected 
JavaScript code extracting the malicious code and redirecting users to the exploit kit landing 
page. On the landing page the infection with different breeds of malware is performed, 
typically by using several Flash vulnerabilities.  
 
In 2016 another type of exploit kit relying upon malvertising has been identified. DNSChanger 
hides an AES encryption key within an innocent looking ad to decrypt the network traffic 
generated by the exploit kit. The scope of DNSChanger is to launch brute-force attacks against 
the network routers to take control over the victim's network and inject ads in all exchanged 
traffic. While Stegano/Astrum and DNSChanger are niche products, the Sundown exploit kit is 
one of the major players in the exploit kit market that introduced data hiding methods to the 
wider cybercriminal audience. In particular, Sundown uses steganography in two ways: i) to 
covertly exfiltrate information stolen from the infected system in PNG files which are 
uploaded to an Imgur album where cybercriminals can access them undisturbed (see, the 
CryLocker ransomware campaign); ii) to hide the exploit code delivered to the victims.  
 
4. The Road Ahead 
As hinted above, in the past information hiding has been mainly associated with the world of 
espionage or extremism and trends were driven by developments in this area. However, in 
recent years we have experienced a massive growth in cybercrime and due to the 
lucrativeness of this “business” this tendency is likely to continue [3]. In the area of 
cybercrime we see the following main developments: increased stealth, commoditization of 
malware, and exploitation of Internet of Things (IoT) devices. Cybercriminals will put a higher 
emphasis on making it harder to detect and trace back malware to the origin and this will be a 
main driver for the increased future use of information hiding. 
 
Since a main goal of malware developers is to be one step ahead, they will always try to 
improve their information hiding techniques. One avenue is to utilize better digital media 
steganography algorithms. Improved algorithms, which are harder to detect and eliminate 
than the currently used ones, are already available and known among academics (e.g. F5 [13], 
HUGO [14]). Another strategy is to hide in new services or protocols. Services and protocols, 
such as Skype/VoIP [15], BitTorrent, SCTP [16], can be targeted resulting in a “needle in a hay 
stack” problem when it comes to detecting covert communication among a large number of 
similar connections.  
 
Another future direction is to exploit the currently ongoing IPv4 to IPv6 transition. Malware 
can take advantage of misconfigured nodes or hosts with IPv4-only stacks unable to process 
IPv6 malicious traffic. Malware also increasingly exploits the diffusion of HTTPS by hiding in 
HTTPS or TLS traffic, which cannot be easily inspected (see, e.g., [10] which claims that over 
one third of malware already uses HTTPS).  
 
Botnets will remain an important tool for cybercriminals for various purposes, such as 
managing DDoS attacks or sending spam emails. Since bots can be relatively easily identified 
by observing the C&C traffic, masquerading this traffic is very important. While most existing 
approaches are simple, for example, C&C protocols hide in HTTP, IRC or DNS, academic 
research recently demonstrated how to completely transform a C&C protocol to mimic 
another innocuous protocol [18]. Future botnets may utilize overlay networks that use only 
steganographic methods to communicate (stego-botnets) [17]. 
The DNS protocol is a natural choice as cover for C&C traffic or for data exfiltration as it 
cannot be blocked. Developing stealthier covert channels on top of DNS and developing the 
countermeasures to detect these is an ongoing arms race [19], which could become even more 
interesting once DNSSEC will be more widely deployed. 
 
Another ongoing trend is that attacks will more and more target the ever-increasing number 
of IoT devices, such as networked sensors, CCTV cameras, smart TVs and DVRs, smart home 
and building appliances and industrial control systems, rather than the traditional devices, 
such as PCs. In many cases IoT devices are soft targets as their limited processing capabilities 
limit the implemented security mechanisms and even worse the low cost of many of these 
devices means that security is often an afterthought for manufacturers. Attacks on IoT devices 
also allow user profiling, and maliciously interfering with the physical world. Moreover, 
malware can utilize the IoT to hide secret data [11], for instance, an attacker can secretly store 
data in unused registers of IoT devices or by slightly modifying actuator states [12]. 
 
Currently deployed steganography methods are often simple. The main reason for this is that 
current protection solutions, such as intrusion detection systems (IDSs), hardly detect any 
form of steganography in practice and thus, malware developers are not forced to apply more 
sophisticated steganography. Nevertheless, recent threats often merge simple traffic covert 
channel techniques with memory-resident or file-less implementations to make them 
stealthier and able to cover the tracks on the infected host, e.g., in the filesystem. 
 
However, data leakage protection (DLP) solutions increasingly aim to detect steganographic 
transmissions and this will force malware authors to improve the covertness of their data 
leakage techniques. That said, cybercriminals will increasingly choose off-the-shelf malware 
rather than develop custom malware, which would require higher investment. Once more 
advanced steganography finds its way into off-the-shelf malware products, such as exploit 
kits, it would become widely used at relatively little extra cost to the cybercriminals. 
 
In the future, malware de-obfuscation and steganography analysis must be done in a more 
systematic and efficient way when the volume of more sophisticated malware increases. 
Frameworks for distributed and automated malware analysis like MASS [20] could be a 
suitable approach for handling large volumes of malware samples retrieved from honeynets. 
 
5. Conclusions and Future Work 
In this paper we presented the knowledge gathered within the CUIng initiative on threats 
using information hiding. As shown, a very important lesson learned is about the efficiency 
achieved by modern malware to remain covert for a long time. Even if steganographic 
techniques are not the only ingredient for this success, the ability of creating and exploiting 
covert channels for C&C and exfiltration purposes surely plays a role (see, e.g., Regin which 
acted covered from 2008 to 2014). This fact is exacerbated by a worrying lack of techniques 
for detecting information-hiding-capable threats, especially in the domain of IoT/automation 
equipment. A possible cause is the poor generalizability of the process of detecting 
information hiding; many detection techniques are tightly coupled with specific hiding 
methods, the cover they use, the scenario in which they are used and the technology on which 
they depend. Since creating new hiding methods by applying known techniques to new 
protocols, scenarios and technology is relatively easy, countermeasures are always at least 
one step behind. Therefore, the industry and the academia should focus on the investigation 
and the development of new and general tools or add-ons for the most common network 
security solutions. A possible idea to avoid a plethora of plug-ins or standalone solution for 
coping with malware using information hiding is the use of new more general indicators, such 
as general patterns used by different hiding techniques or energy consumption. 
 
As shown, information hiding increases the complexity of the problem space to be faced when 
addressing cybersecurity. Organized initiatives like CUIng can be the incubator where a long-
term cure for information hiding malware is developed, since modern cyber-threats require a 
“multidisciplinary” approach relying on the collaboration of many experts from the industry, 
academia, and law enforcement agencies. 
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